Quantum repeated games revisited by Frackiewicz, Piotr
ar
X
iv
:1
10
9.
37
53
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
7 S
ep
 20
11
Quantum repeated games revisited
Piotr Fra¸ckiewicz
Institute of Mathematics of the Polish Academy of Sciences
00-956 Warsaw, Poland
October 30, 2018
Abstract
We present a scheme for playing quantum repeated 2× 2 games based on the
Marinatto and Weber’s approach [1] to quantum games. As a potential applica-
tion, we study twice repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that results
not available in classical game can be obtained when the game is played in the
quantum way. Before we present our idea, we comment on the previous scheme
of playing quantum repeated games proposed in [2]. We point out the drawbacks
that make results in [2] unacceptable.
1 Introduction
The Marinatto-Weber (MW) idea of quantum 2× 2 games introduced in [1] has found
application in many branches of game theory. The MW approach to evolutionary games
[3] and Stackelberg equilibrium [4] are merely two of many applications. In the papers
[5] and [6] we have shown that the MW idea is applicable as well to finite games in
extensive form. Consequently, this scheme of playing quantum games can be applied
to many other game-theoretical problems. In this paper we deal with the problem
of quantization of twice repeated 2 × 2 games. Since a finitely repeated game is just
a particular case of a finite extensive game, we apply the method based on [5] and [6] to
play the repeated game in the quantum way. The idea of quantum repreated games was
first introduced in [2], where the Authors adapt the MW scheme for the twice repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Then, they investigate if results that are unavailable when the
game is played classically can occur in the quantum area. The point of the paper [2] is
to provide sufficient conditions for players’ cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
We examine the idea of [2] before we define our scheme. Firstly, we study the problem
of cooperation considered by the Authors of [2] and we prove that player’s cooperation
in the game defined by the protocol proposed in [2] is not possible. Secondly, we check
whether that scheme is actually in accordance with the concept of repeated game. As we
will show, the discussed scheme does not include the classical twice repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, hence it cannot be the quantum realization of this game in the spirit of the
MW approach. To support our arguments we propose the new protocol for a twice
repeated 2 × 2 game and prove that our idea generalizes the classical twice repeated
game. Our paper also contains the proof of the advantage of the quantum scheme over
the classical one: We prove that both players can benefit from playing game via our
protocol. Moreover, we show that contrary to the situation encountered in the classical
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Figure 1: The strategic a) and extensive b) form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
game, the cooperation of the players is possible for some sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma
games played repeatedly when our quantum approach is used.
Studying our paper requires little background in game theory. All notions like extensive
game, information set, strategy, equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium etc. used in
the paper are explained in an accessible way, for example, in [7] and [8]. The adequate
preliminaries can also be found in the paper [5], where quantum games in an extensive
form are examined.
2 Twice repeated games and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is one of the most fundamental problems in game theory
(the general form of the PD according to [9] is given in Fig. 1(a). It demonstrates why
the rationality of players can lead them to an inefficient outcome. Although the payoff
vector (R,R) is better to both players than (P, P ), they cannot obtain this outcome
since each player’s strategy C (cooperation) is strictly dominated by D (defection). As
a result, the players end up with payoff P corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium
(D,D).
A similar scenario occurs in a case of finitely repeated PD. The concept of a finitely
repeated game assumes playing a static game (a stage of the repeated game) for a fixed
number of times. Additionally, the players are informed about results of consecutive
stages. In the twice repeated case it means that each player’s strategy specify an action
at the first stage and four actions at the second stage where a particular action is chosen
depending on what of the four outcomes of the first stage has occurred. It is clearly
visible when we write twice repeated game in the extensive form (see Fig. 2). The first
stage of the twice repeated PD in the extensive form is simply the game depicted in
Fig. 1(b) where the players specify an action C or D at the information set 1.1 and 2.1,
respectively (the information sets of player 2 are distinguished by dotted line connecting
the nodes to show lack of knowledge of the second player about the previous move of
the first player). When the players choose their actions, the result of the first stage is
announced. Since they have knowledge about the results of the first stage, they can
choose different actions at the second stage depending on the previous result, hence the
next four game trees from Fig. 1 are required to describe the repeated game. The game
tree exhibits ten information sets (five for each player labelled 1.· and 2.·, respectively)
at which each of the players has two moves. Thus, each of them has 25 = 32 strategies
as they specify C or D at their own five information sets.
2
Figure 2: The extensive form for a twice repeated Prisoner Dilemma.
To find the Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated game it is convenient to use the
property that the equilibrium profile always implies the Nash equilibrium at the last
stage of the game. Therefore, to find the Nash equilibrium in the twice repeated PD it
is sufficient to consider strategy profiles that generate the profile (D,D) at the second
stage. Then it follows that D is the best response for players at the first stage as well.
By induction it can be shown that playing the action D at each stage of finitely repeated
PD constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium. It is worth noting that if a single stage of
repeated game has more than one equilibrium, different Nash equilibria may be played
at the last stage depending on results of previous stages. For example, let us consider
the Battle of the Sexes (BoS) game given by the following bimatrix:
O F
Γ :
O
F
[
(α, β) (γ, γ)
(γ, γ) (β, α)
]
, where α > β > γ.
(1)
It has two pure Nash equilibria, namely, (O,O) and (F, F ). Let us examine now the
twice repeated BoS. Obviously, its game tree is the same as one in Fig. 2. Let us assign
appropriate sum of two stage payoff outcomes to each possible profile (like it has been
done in the case of the twice repeated PD). Then we find many different Nash equilibria.
One of these is to play the Nash equilibrium (O,O) at the first stage, keep playing (O,O)
at the second stage if the outcome of the first one is (O,O) or (O,F ), otherwise to play
stage-game Nash equilibrium (F, F ).
3 Comment on ‘Quantum repeated games’ by Iqbal
and Toor [2]
Let us remind the MW approach to playing the PD repeatedly introduced in [2]. Ac-
cording to this concept the two-stage PD is placed in H = (C2)
⊗4
complex Hilbert
space with the computational basis. The game starts with preparing 4-qubit pure state
represented by a unit vector in H . The general form of this state is described as follows:
|ψin〉 =
∑
x1,x2,x3,x4=0,1
λx1,x2,x3,x4|x1, x2, x3, x4〉,
where λx1,x2,x3,x4 ∈ C and
∑
x1,x2,x3,x4=0,1
|λx1,x2,x3,x4|
2 = 1.
(2)
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Players’ moves are identified with the identity operator σ0 and the bit flip Pauli operator
σ1. Player 1 is allowed to act on the first and third qubit, and player 2 acts on the second
and fourth one. In the first stage of the game the two first qubits are manipulated. Let
ρin be the density operator for the initial state (2). Then the state ρ after the players’
actions takes the form
ρ =
∑
κ1,κ2=0,1
pκ1qκ2(σ
1
κ1
⊗ σ2κ2)ρin(σ
1
κ1
⊗ σ2κ2),
and
∑
κ1=0,1
pκ1 =
∑
κ2=0,1
qκ2 = 1,
(3)
where pκ1 (qκ2) is the probability of applying σ
1
κ1
(σ2κ2) to the first (second) qubit. Next,
the other two qubits are manipulated which, according to Iqbal and Toor, corresponds
to the second stage of the classical game. The operation σ3κ3 on the third qubit with
probability pκ3 and operation σ
4
κ4
on the fourth qubit with probability qκ4 change the
state ρ to
ρfin =
∑
κ3,κ4=0,1
pκ3qκ4(σ
3
κ3
⊗ σ4κ4)ρ(σ
3
κ3
⊗ σ4κ4),
and
∑
κ3=0,1
pκ3 =
∑
κ4=0,1
qκ4 = 1.
(4)
The next step is to measure the final state ρfin in order to determine final payoffs. The
measurement is defined by the four payoffs operators Xi.j, i, j = 1, 2 associated with
particular: player i and stage j. That is
X1.1 = (R|00〉〈00|+ S|01〉〈01|+ T |10〉〈10|+ P |11〉〈11|)⊗ 1
⊗2;
X1.2 = 1
⊗2 ⊗ (R|00〉〈00|+ S|01〉〈01|+ T |10〉〈10|+ P |11〉〈11|);
X2.1 = (R|00〉〈00|+ T |01〉〈01|+ S|10〉〈10|+ P |11〉〈11|)⊗ 1
⊗2;
X2.2 = 1
⊗2 ⊗ (R|00〉〈00|+ T |01〉〈01|+ S|10〉〈10|+ P |11〉〈11|).
(5)
Then the expected payoff Ei.j for player i at stage j when player 1 chooses strategy
(σ1κ1, σ
3
κ3
) and player 2 chooses (σ2κ2 , σ
4
κ4
) is obtained by the following formula:
Ei.j
(
(σ1κ1 , σ
3
κ3
), (σ2κ2 , σ
4
κ4
)
)
= tr(Xi.jρfin). (6)
The authors took up the issue of cooperation in two-stage PD. Given the initial state
|ψin〉 = λ0000|0000〉+ λ0011|0011〉+ λ1100|1100〉+ λ1111|1111〉 (7)
and fixed payoffs
T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0, (8)
they identify σ0 and σ1 as actions of cooperation and defection, respectively, and claim
that conditions
|λ0000|
2 + |λ0011|
2 ≤
1
3
, |λ0011|
2 + |λ1111|
2 ≤
1
3
(9)
are sufficient to choose σ0 by both players (thereby cooperating) at the first stage given
that the players have chosen σ1 at the second one. We raise below two objections
concerning the results of the paper [2].
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3.1 The incompatibility of the protocol (2)-(6) and theory of
repeated games
The main fault of the protocol (2)-(6) is that the twice repeated game cannot be de-
scribed in this way. In fact, it quantizes the game PD played twice when the players
are not informed about a result of the first stage. It is noticeable, for example, when we
re-examine the way of finding the optimal solution provided in [2]. The authors analyze
the game backwards, first by focusing on the Nash equilibria at the second stage. They
set condition for the profile (σ31, σ
4
1) to be the Nash equilibrium at the second stage.
Next, given that (σ31, σ
4
1) is fixed, they determine the set of amplitudes for which the
profile ((σ10, σ
2
0), (σ
3
1, σ
4
1)) is the Nash equilibrium of the game implied by (2)-(6). This
method to find the Nash equilibria is not correct since it doesn’t include the possibility
that players make their actions depending on a result of the first stage. Although the
problem seems to be insignificant where a stage of a repeated game has unique Nash
equilibrium, it becomes visible in remaining cases. Let us consider the initial state (7)
satisfying the requirement
2(|λ0000|
2 + |λ1100|
2) = |λ0011|
2 + |λ1111|
2 (10)
and let us take (8) to be PD’s payoffs. Then, the expected payoffs for the players at the
second stage of the game defined by the scheme (2)-(6) are as follows:
Ei.2
(
(·, σ30), (·, σ
4
0)
)
= E1.2
(
(·, σ31), (·, σ
4
0)
)
= E2.2
(
(·, σ30), (·, σ
4
1)
)
= 5|λ|;
E1.2
(
(·, σ30), (·, σ
4
1)
)
= E2.2
(
(·, σ31), (·, σ
4
0)
)
= 10|λ|;
Ei.2
(
(·, σ31), (·, σ
4
1)
)
= 7|λ|,
(11)
where |λ| = |λ0000|
2 + |λ1100|
2 and i = 1, 2. Results of (11) imply continuum of Nash
equilibria in the second stage (it is easy to note, for example, when we draw a 2 × 2
bimatrix with entries defined by (11)), among them ((·, σ30), (·, σ
4
1)) and ((·, σ
3
1), (·, σ
4
0)).
Bearing in mind the remark in Section 2 about possible profiles in the BoS game, the
correct protocol for quantum repeated games should be able to assign a payoff outcome
(by the measurement (5)) to a strategy profile, where different Nash equilibria are played
at the second stage depending on actions chosen at the first one. However, an example of
a profile where the players play ((·, σ30), (·, σ
4
1)) at the second stage if a result of the first
stage is ((σ10, ·), (σ
2
0, ·)), and they play ((·, σ
3
1), (·, σ
4
0)) in other cases cannot be measured
by the scheme (2)-(6). Since there is two qubit register allotted to the second stage, it
allows to write only one pair of actions (σ3κ3 , σ
4
κ4
) before the measurement is made.
An argument against the scheme in [2] can be expressed in another way. Namely, all
results included in [2] can be obtained by considering simplified protocol (2)-(6) where
the sequential procedure (3) and (4) for determining the final state ρfin is simply replaced
with
ρfin =
4⊗
j=1
σjκjρin
4⊗
j=1
σjκj , (12)
In this case, the first and the second player simultaneously pick (σ1κ1 , σ
3
κ3
) and (σ2κ2 , σ
4
κ4
),
respectively, having essentially only four strategies each. However, as we mentioned in
the previous section, each player has 32 strategies in the classical twice repeated game.
As a result, the protocol (2)-(6) cannot coincide with the classical case if |ψin〉 = |0000〉.
Despite the fact that the Authors assume that a player knows her opponent’s action
taken previously, the scheme (2)-(6) does not take it into consideration. In consequence,
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a game being quantized by (2)-(6) differs from the game in Fig. 2 in that the nodes 1.2,
1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 (2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5) lie at the same information set (are connected
with dotted line).
3.2 The misconception about the cooperative strategy in the
PD played via the MW approach
The another fault, we are going to discuss, is based on misinterpreting the operators σ0
and σ1 as cooperation and defection in the protocol given by (2)-(6). Let us consider the
initial state |ψin〉 where the two first qubits associated with the first stage are prepared in
the state |x1, x2〉, for x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}. Then the first stage of the game given by (2)-(6) is
isomorphic to the classical PD game. When the initial state is |00〉 then σ0 corresponds
to the action C and σ1 corresponds to D. However, when the initial state is |11〉, the
action ‘cooperate’ are identified with σ1 and the action ‘defect’ with σ0 since by putting
ρfin = (σ
1
κ1
⊗ σ2κ2)|11〉〈11|(σ
1
κ1
⊗ σ2κ2) into the formula (6) we have
(tr(X1.1ρfin), tr(X2.1ρfin)) =


(R,R), if (κ1, κ2) = (1, 1);
(S, T ), if (κ1, κ2) = (1, 0);
(T, S), if (κ1, κ2) = (0, 1);
(P, P ), if (κ1, κ2) = (0, 0).
(13)
That is, the outcome of the game does not depend intrinsically on the operators but
depends on the initial state and on what the final state ρfin can be obtained through
the available operators. Thus identification of operators with actions taken in classical
game without taking into consideration the form of the initial state is not correct. The
misidentification assumed in [2] implies that the condition (9) cannot solve the problem
formulated in this paper. It is clearly visible when we take, for example, the initial state
|ψin〉 = |1100〉. It satisfies the inequalities (9) thus, σ0 is optimal at the first stage for
each player. In fact, σ0 is the action ‘defect’ as it is shown in (13). Note also that the
payoff corresponding to the profile (σ0, σ0) at the first stage and (σ1, σ1) at the second
one is 2P for each player - total payoff for the defection. Thus, the condition (9) does
not ensure the cooperation at the first stage.
Quite the opposite, it turns out that the players never cooperate when they play the
game defined by (2)-(6). Let us consider any initial state (2) in which the first and the
second qubit are prepared in a way that for (s1, s2) = ((σ
1
κ1
, σ3κ3), (σ
2
κ2
, σ4κ4)) we have
(E1.1(s1, s2), E2.1(s1, s2)) =


(R′, R′), if (κ1, κ2) = (0, 0);
(S ′, T ′), if (κ1, κ2) = (0, 1);
(T ′, S ′), if (κ1, κ2) = (1, 0);
(P ′, P ′), if (κ1, κ2) = (1, 1).
(14)
where the values T ′, R′, P ′, S ′ meet the requirements of the PD given in Fig.1(a), so the
operators σ0 and σ1 can be regarded as cooperation and defection, respectively. Next,
let us estimate the difference
E1((σ
1
1, σ
3
0), s2)− E1((σ
1
0, σ
3
0), s2) for any s2 = (σ
2
κ2
, σ4κ4), (15)
where E1 = E1.1 + E1.2. Since the same actions are taken on the third and the fourth
qubit, we have E1.2((σ
1
0, σ
3
0), s2) = E1.2((σ
1
1, σ
3
0), s2), therefore, the value E1 depends only
on E1.1, Thus, for s2 = (σ
2
κ2
, σ4κ4), we obtain from (14) that
0 < E1((σ
1
1 , σ
3
0), s2)− E1((σ
1
0 , σ
3
0), s2) =
{
T ′ − R′, if κ2 = 0;
P ′ − S ′, if κ2 = 1.
(16)
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In similar way we can prove that the strategy (σ10, σ
3
1) of player 1 is strictly dominated
by (σ11 , σ
3
1). As a result, we conclude that σ
1
1 is the best response of player 1 at the first
stage. Symmetry of payoffs in PD implies that strategy (σ20 , σ
4
0) of player 2 is strictly
dominated by (σ21, σ
4
0), as well as (σ
2
0, σ
4
1) is strictly dominated by (σ
2
1, σ
4
1). Thus, there
is no Nash equilibrium in which the players choose σ0 (cooperation) at the first stage.
4 The MW approach to twice repeated quantum
games
In this section we propose a scheme of playing a twice repeated 2 × 2 quantum game
that is free from the faults we have pointed in the previous section. Our construction
is based on the protocol that we proposed in [5] where general finite extensive quantum
games were considered. Since a repeated game is a special case of an extensive game,
we can adapt this concept. Next, we examine what results can be obtained from such
protocol. In particular, we re-examine the problem of cooperation studied in [2].
4.1 Construction of a twice repeated 2× 2 quantum game via
the MW protocol
Let us consider a 2 × 2 game defined by the outcomes Oι1,ι2, ι1, ι2 = 0, 1. The twice
repeated 2× 2 quantum game played according to the MW approach is as follows:
Let H = (C2)
⊗10
be a Hilbert space with the computational basis {|x1, x2, . . . , x10〉},
xj = 0, 1. Then the initial state of the game is a ten-qubit pure state represented by
a unit vector in the space H :
|ψin〉 =
210−1∑
x=0
λx|x〉, for λx ∈ C and
∑
x
|λx|
2 = 1, (17)
where the sum is over all possible decimal values of x = (x)10 = (x1x2 . . . x10)2. The
players are allowed to apply operators σ0 and σ1. The qubits with odd indices are manip-
ulated by player 1 and the qubits labelled by even indices are manipulated by player 2.
Such assignment implies 32 possible strategies for each players as they specify five opera-
tions σjκj (where j and κj indicate qubit number and operation number, respectively) on
their own qubits. We denote a player i’s strategy by τi = (σ
i
κi
, σi+2κi+2 , σ
i+4
κi+4
, σi+6κi+6, σ
i+8
κi+8
),
where i = 1, 2. The profile τ = (τ1, τ2) gives rise to the final state:
|ψfin〉 =
10⊗
j=1
σjκj |ψin〉. (18)
If the players each take τ t1 and τ
t′
2 with probability pt and qt′ , respectively, that corre-
sponds to the state |ψt,t
′
fin
〉 (defined by (18)) with probability ptqt′ , then the final state is
the density operator associated with the ensemble {ptqt′ , |ψ
t,t′
fin
〉}. That is
ρfin =
∑
t,t′
ptqt′ |ψ
t,t′
fin
〉〈ψt,t
′
fin
|. (19)
Till now, a difference between the concept in [2] and our protocol lies in the dimension
of the space H . The next difference is clearly visible in a description of measurement
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operators. The measurement on ρfin that determines an outcome of the game is de-
scribed by a collection {X1, X2.00, X2.01, X2.10, X2.11}, where its components are defined
as follows:
X1 =
∑
x1,x2∈{0,1}
Ox1,x2|x1, x2〉〈x1, x2| ⊗ 1
⊗8; (20)
X2.00 =
∑
x3,x4∈{0,1}
Ox3,x4|00〉〈00| ⊗ |x3, x4〉〈x3, x4| ⊗ 1
⊗6;
X2.01 =
∑
x5,x6∈{0,1}
Ox5,x6|01〉〈01| ⊗ 1
⊗2 ⊗ |x5, x6〉〈x5, x6| ⊗ 1
⊗4;
X2.10 =
∑
x7,x8∈{0,1}
Ox7,x8|10〉〈10| ⊗ 1
⊗4 ⊗ |x7, x8〉〈x7, x8| ⊗ 1
⊗2;
X2.11 =
∑
x9,x10∈{0,1}
Ox9,x10|11〉〈11| ⊗ 1
⊗6 ⊗ |x9, x10〉〈x9, x10|.
(21)
Then the expected outcomes: Ei.1 at the first stage and Ei.2 at the second stage are
calculated by using the following formulae:
Ei.1 = tr(X1ρfin), Ei.2 = tr
(∑
ι1,ι2
X2.ι1,ι2ρfin
)
. (22)
Let us give justification of our construction. Notice that 210 is a minimal dimension of
the space H in order to play the twice repeated 2 × 2 game. Since a player’s strategy
in a twice repeated 2×2 game specifies action at the first stage and at each of four sub-
games fixed by the outcome of the first stage, the quantum protocol needs a five-qubit
register to write a player’s strategy. The first two qubits are used to perform operations
at the first stage of the repeated game. Then given the form of X1 and strategies of
players restricted to manipulate the first and the second qubit, in fact, the protocol
(17)-(22) coincides with the MW scheme of playing 2 × 2 quantum game [1]. The re-
maining eight qubits are used to define players’ moves at the second stage. That is, by
pairing consecutive qubits from the third qubit onwards, actions at the second stage are
defined on appropriate pair of qubits depending on the outcome at the previous stage.
For example, given the outcome O10 has occurred at the first stage (that is the outcome
10 on the first two qubits has been measured), the expected outcome Ei.2 depends only
on operation on x7 and x8, i.e, Ei.2 = tr(X2.10ρfin). Then the players play the second
stage in the same way as in the protocol (2)-(6). However, contrary to the previous idea,
each player specifies her move for each possible outcome Ox1,x2.
A game generated by our scheme naturally coincides with the classical case when appro-
priate initial state is prepared. We prove this fact by means of a convenient sequential
approach to (17)-(22) provided in the next section.
4.2 Extensive form of a quantum twice repeated 2× 2 game
The protocol (17)-(22) allows to put a game into an extensive form by using a similar
method to what was described in [5]. The extensive form is obtained through sequential
calculating the final state ρfin according to the following procedure. At first the players
manipulate the first pair of qubits. Then the measurement in the computational basis is
made on these qubits (as a result, an outcome Oι1,ι2 of the first stage is returned). The
measured outcome is sent to the players. Depending on the measurement outcome ι1, ι2
that occurs with probability p(ι1, ι2) the players act on the next pair of qubits: if ι1, ι2
is observed then player 1 and player 2 manipulate qubits 2ι+3 and 2ι+4, respectively,
where ι = (ι1ι2)2 is a decimal representation of a binary number ι1ι2. The procedure
can be formally described as follows:
Algoritm 4.1
1. (σ1κ1 ⊗ σ
2
κ2
)|ψin〉 = |ψ〉 The players perform their operations σ1κ1 and σ
2
κ2
on the initial state |ψin〉.
2. →
Mι1,ι2|ψ〉√
〈ψ|Mι1,ι2 |ψ〉
= |ψι1,ι2〉 The first two qubits in the state ρ are measured.
The measurement is described by a collection
{Mι1,ι2 : Mι1,ι2 = |ι1, ι2〉〈ι1, ι2| ⊗ 1
⊗8, ι1, ι2 =
0, 1}.
3. → {p(ι1, ι2), (σ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4)|ψι1,ι2〉}
p(ι1, ι2) = 〈ψ|Mι1,ι2|ψ〉
Given that the outcome ι1, ι2 has been observed,
players 1 and 2 perform operations σ2ι+3
κ2ι+3
and
σ2ι+4
κ2ι+4
on the post-measurement state.
It turns out that we can prove
Proposition 4.2 The density operator |ψfin〉〈ψfin| associated with state (18) and the
density operator for the ensemble {p(ι1, ι2), (σ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4)|ψι1,ι2〉} in Algorithm 4.1
determine the same outcomes Ei.1 and Ei.2 with regard to the measurement (20)–(21).
Proof. Let us put ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. Given that |ψι1,ι2〉〈ψι1,ι2| = Mι1,ι2ρMι1,ι2/p(ι1, ι2) the
state ρ′fin can be written as:
ρ′fin =
∑
ι1,ι2=0,1
σ2ι+3κ2ι+3 ⊗ σ
2ι+4
κ2ι+4
Mι1,ι2ρMι1,ι2σ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4 . (23)
Since the first and the second qubits are measured, any operation σjκj for which j 6= 1, 2
does not influence the measurement. Therefore we have
ρ′fin =
∑
ι1,ι2=0,1
Mι1,ι2σ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4ρ σ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4Mι1,ι2. (24)
Note that Xι′
1
,ι′
2
Mι1,ι2 = δι,ι′Xι′1,ι′2, where δι,ι′ is the Kronecker’s delta, and ι = (ι1, ι2)2,
and ι′ = (ι′1, ι
′
2)2, Using the form (24) of ρ
′
fin we have
tr
(∑
ι′
X2.ι′
1
,ι′
2
ρ′fin
)
= tr
(∑
ι
X2.ι1,ι2σ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4ρσ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4
)
. (25)
For each ι the trace of each term of the sum on the right-hand side of equation (25)
depends only on an operation σjκj on a qubit j, where j ∈ {1, 2, 2ι + 3, 2ι + 4}. Thus,
the equation (25) holds when also the rest of operations σjκj are added:
tr
(∑
ι
X2.ι1,ι2ρ
′
fin
)
= tr
(∑
ι
X2.ι1,ι2
10⊗
j=1
σjκjρin
10⊗
j=1
σjκj
)
. (26)
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As a result, the left-hand side of (26) is equal to the expected outcome Ei.2 associated
with the final state |ψfin〉〈ψfin|. To prove that ρ
′
fin also determines the expected outcome
Ei.1 let us see that X1 and {Mι1,ι2} are the same projective measurement up to the
eigenvalues. Hence
tr (X1ρ
′
fin) = tr
(
X1σ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4ρσ
2ι+3
κ2ι+3
⊗ σ2ι+4κ2ι+4
)
. (27)
Since ρ = σ1κ1 ⊗ σ
2
κ2
ρinσ
1
κ1
⊗ σ2κ2 , we obtain
tr (X1ρ
′
fin) = tr
(
X1
10⊗
j=1
σjκjρin
10⊗
j=1
σjκj
)
. (28)
Equations (26) and (28) show that the state determined by the sequential procedure
and state (18) set the same outcomes Ei.1 and Ei.2 for i = 1, 2. Using the same way as
above and the linearity of the trace it can be proved that the equivalence is true if the
players pick nondegenerate mixed strategies as well. 
Having a sequential approach that is in conformity with protocol (17)-(22) we are able to
analyze a quantum repeated game through an extensive form. It can facilitate the work
significantly bearing in mind 32×32 bimatrix associated with the normal representation
of twice repeated 2 × 2 game. Let us study the game tree drawn from the sequential
procedure if the initial state (17) takes the form
|ψin〉 = λ0|0〉
⊗10 + λ1|1〉
⊗10. (29)
Let us use the sequential procedure step by step. At first the players manipulate σ1κ1
and σ2κ2 . Hence we obtain the following state:
σ1κ1 ⊗ σ
2
κ2
|ψin〉 = λ0|κ1, κ2〉|0〉
⊗8 + λ1|κ1, κ2〉|1〉
⊗8, (30)
where κj is the negation of κj . A game tree at this phase is just the game tree corre-
sponding to a 2× 2 game (see Fig. 1(b)), where σjκj for j = 1, 2, κj = 0, 1 are associated
with respective branches of that game tree. After a sequence of actions (σ1κ1 , σ
2
κ2
) the
measurement {Mι1,ι2} is made. Let us focus on the cases when the measurement outcome
00 or 11 has been observed. The form of (30) tells us that the measurement outcomes
00 and 11 are possible only if the profile at the first stage takes the form of (σ1κ, σ
2
κ),
where κ = 0, 1. Then, the probability p(00) (p(11)) that the measurement outcome
00 (11) will occur is equal to |λκ|
2 (|λκ|
2). Thus, the game tree is extended to include
random actions 00 and 11 with associated probabilities after the both histories (σ1κ, σ
2
κ).
Since further moves of the players depend only on the measurement, the pair of histo-
ries (σ10, σ
2
0, 00), (σ
1
1, σ
2
1 , 00) and the pair (σ
1
0, σ
2
0, 11), (σ
1
1, σ
2
1 , 11) constitute two separate
information sets. Next, given that 00 (11) has occurred, following the sequential pro-
cedure, the players manipulate third and fourth (ninth and tenth) qubit at the second
stage. Therefore another extensive form of 2 × 2 is added to each sequence (σ1κ, σ
2
κ, ιι),
where κ, ι = 0, 1. In consequence we obtain a game tree shown in Fig. 3 (a part of the
game tree after histories of (σ1κ, σ
2
κ), κ = 0, 1 is similar). Each outcome associated with
a terminal sequence are determined by a pure state from the ensemble given by the
sequential procedure. For example, after sequence (σ11, σ
2
1) the post-measurement state
takes the form of |0〉⊗2|1〉⊗8 (up to a global phase factor) with probability |λ1|
2, and the
players choose sequence (σ3κ3 , σ
4
κ4
). Then the total outcome Ei := Ei.1 + Ei.2 associated
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Figure 3: The extensive form for a twice repeated Prisoner Dilemma played through
protocol (17)-(22) when the initial state is on the form of (29).
with a sequence (σ11 , σ
2
1, 00, σ
3
κ3
, σ4κ4) is calculated according to formulae (22):
Ei = tr
((
X1 +
∑
ι1,ι2
X2.ι1,ι2
)
(|0〉〈0|)⊗2|κ3, κ4〉〈κ3, κ4|(|1〉〈1|)
⊗6
)
. (31)
The extensive approach allows us to see directly that our scheme coincides with the
classical twice repeated 2 × 2 game when |ψin〉 = |0〉
⊗10. Without loss of generality,
let the outcomes Oι1,ι2 be the payoff outcomes corresponding to the PD game. Then
putting |λ0|
2 = 1 in (29) and assuming σj0 := C, σ
j
1
:= D the game in Fig. 3 depicts
exactly the classical twice repeated PD game (compare Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).
4.3 Twice repeated PD game played by means of the protocol
(17)-(22)
Let us study the twice repeated PD game played with the use of our scheme. Analysis
of our protocol with the general form initial state (17) is a laborious task and it deserves
a separate paper to report about. Nevertheless, we can derive many interesting features
with less effort considering the initial state of the form
|ψin〉 =
5⊗
j=1
|ϕj〉, where |ϕj〉 is a state of 2j − 1 and 2j qubit. (32)
Let us consider first the problem of optimization of the equilibrium payoffs, given a space
of initial states as a domain.
Proposition 4.3 There are infinitely many settings of the initial state (17) for which
the twice repeated PD game played with the use of the protocol (17)-(22) has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium with the equilibrium payoff (2Q, 2Q) such that Q > P .
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Proof. Let us put the initial state (32) into the protocol (17)-(22) assuming that
|ϕj〉 = |ϕ〉 for any j. Then, the measurement {Mι1,ι2} on the first pair of qubits does
affect others qubits. Moreover, given that the outcome Oι1,ι2 has occurred, the expected
outcome Ei.2 depends only on manipulating on one pair of qubits |ϕ〉 due to the form of
(21). Therefore, regardless of the first stage outcome Oι1,ι2, the players are faced with
a 2× 2 quantum game at the second stage (played via the MW approach). That is, the
players are faced with the problem
(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|, {σ0, σ1}, X
′
i) , (33)
where player 1 and 2 apply operators from the set {σ0, σ1} on the first and the second
qubit of |ϕ〉, respectively. The outcome operator X ′i takes the form
X ′i =
∑
y1,y2=0,1
Oy1,y2|y1, y2〉〈y1, y2|, (34)
and the expected outcome is equal to
Ei(σ
1
κ1
, σ2κ2) = tr
(
σ1κ1 ⊗ σ
2
κ2
|ϕ〉〈ϕ|σ1κ1 ⊗ σ
2
κ2
X ′i
)
. (35)
Obviously, the first stage game is also described exactly as the triple (33). Since a quan-
tum game according to the MW approach is a game expressed by a bimatrix, it leads
us to the conclusion that protocol (17)-(22) with the initial state |ϕ〉⊗5, in fact, can be
treated as a twice repeated bimatrix game generated by (33).
Let us substitute Oy1,y2 for the payoffs of the PD game in the game (33) and examine it
towards uniqueness of Nash equilibria. Putting a state |ϕ〉 = λ0|00〉+ λ1|11〉, for which
the amplitudes of |ϕ〉 satisfy the condition:
0 < |λ0|
2 <
min{T − R,P − S}
T −R + P − S
(36)
the inequalities
E1
(
σ10, σ
2
κ2
)
> E1
(
σ11, σ
2
κ2
)
and E2
(
σ1κ1 , σ
2
0
)
> E1
(
σ1κ1 , σ
2
1
)
(37)
are true for any κ1, κ2 = 0, 1. Inequalities (37) imply the unique Nash equilibrium
(σ10, σ
2
0). Moreover, the first inequality of condition (36) ensures that
E1
(
σ10, σ
2
0
)
= |λ0|
2R + |λ1|
2P > P. (38)
Since the game constructed in the proof can be regarded as a classical twice repeated
game, we are allowed to use all facts of classical repeated game theory. One of these tells
us that a unique stage-game Nash equilibrium implies, for any finite number of repeti-
tions, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the stage-game Nash equilibrium
is played in every stage. This completes the proof. 
Of course, the protocol (17)-(22) can be re-formulated for any finitely repeated 2×2 game
and then statement analogical to Proposition 4.3 can be articulated. Unfortunately, the
number of qubits required in our protocol grows exponentially with number of stages.
For example, in the case of a game repeated three times, the protocol (17)-(22) needs
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next 32 qubits to describe the third stage. In general, the number of
∑n
j=1
22j−1 qubits
is required for a 2× 2 game repeated n times.
We shall re-examine now the problem of cooperation considered in [2]. We demonstrated
in Section 3 that the cooperation at the first stage is not possible in the game defined
by the Iqbal and Toor scheme. However, we also showed that this protocol does not
take into consideration a player’s move at the second stage as a function of the first
stage result. Therefore, in fact it does not allow to study the cooperation problem in
a proper way. The following example proves that the cooperation of players is possible
if the twice repeated PD game is played via our scheme.
Example 4.4 Let us set the PD game with payoff vectors
O00 = (4, 4), O01 = (0, 5), O10 = (5, 0), O11 = (1, 1) (39)
inserted in (20) and (21). Let us also assume that the initial state (17) takes the form
|ψin〉 = |0〉
⊗2
(√
0, 6|0〉⊗2 +
√
0, 4|1〉⊗2
)
|0〉⊗6. (40)
A game specified in this way differs from the classical one only in the subgame following
the outcome O00 of the first stage because then Ei.2 depends on operations on entangled
third and fourth qubit. Since two first qubits in the state |00〉 imply the classical PD
game at the first stage, we are permitted to identify the action ‘cooperate’ and the
action ‘defect’ with σ0 and σ1, respectively, assuming C := σ0 and D := σ1. Moreover,
the quantum measurement after the first stage is trivialized in this case and it coincides
with the classical observation in an extensive game. It follows that both the game
defined by (17)-(22), (39), (40) and the classical game can be represented by the same
game tree as well as the same payoff values except when 00 has been measured on the
first pair of qubits after the first stage. Let us determine now the payoff outcomes at
the second stage given that the post-measurement state of the first pair of qubits is
|00〉 (in other words, when player 1’s strategy is τ1 =
(
σ1κ1 , σ
3
κ3
, σ5κ5 , σ
7
κ7
, σ9κ9
)
and player
2’s strategy is τ2 =
(
σ2κ2, σ
4
κ4
, σ6κ6 , σ
8
κ8
, σ10κ10
)
, which makes the strategy profile in the
form (τ1, τ2) = ((σ
1
0, ·, ·, ·, ·), (σ
2
0, ·, ·, ·, ·))). Given the initial state (40) and the form of
operators (21), the payoff outcome Ei.2 for each κ3, κ4 ∈ {0, 1} and i = 1, 2 is as follows:
Ei.2
((
σ10 , σ
3
κ3
, ·, ·, ·), (σ20, σ
4
κ4
, ·, ·, ·
))
= 0, 6Oκ3,κ4 + 0, 4Oκ3,κ4 . (41)
The extensive form of the game with expected payoffs Ei.1+Ei.2 given by (39) is shown
in Fig. 4. Let us examine this game for subgame perfect equilibria. Such profile has to
induce the Nash equilibrium in any subgame fixed by an outcome at first stage. In our
case, it is a profile in which both players take σ1 on qubits from the third qubit onward.
Consequently, in quest of subgame perfect equilibria, we take only the following profiles
into consideration:
(τ1, τ2) ∈
{
σ1κ1 × σ
2
κ2
×
10∏
j=3
σj1
}
. (42)
Then it turns out that the noncooperative subgame perfect equilibrium is still preserved.
If one of the players picks σ1 at the first stage, the best response of the other one is
to pick σ1 too. Therefore, the profile (τ
′
1, τ
′
2) =
∏10
j=1
σj1 constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium. However, contrary to the classical twice repeated PD, there is another
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Figure 4: The extensive form for a twice repeated Prisoner Dilemma (39) played through
protocol (17)-(22) with update on the initial state (40).
subgame perfect equilibrium (τ ′′1 , τ
′′
2 ) in which each player chooses σ0 (cooperates) at
the first stage i.e., τ ′′1 = (σ
1
0, σ
3
1, σ
5
1, σ
7
1 , σ
9
1) and τ
′′
2 = (σ
2
0 , σ
4
1, σ
6
1, σ
8
1, σ
10
1 ). Moreover, only
the latter equilibrium is reasonable since it yields the payoff 6,2 instead of 2 for each
player.
Example 4.4 shows that the cooperation of players is possible when the twice repeated
PD game is played according to our scheme. Unfortunately, the example does not solve
this problem for any PD game. The condition 2R > T +S imposed on the payoffs allows
to select an arbitrary large finite number T (if a sufficiently small number S is selected).
We suppose that an appropriately large T may convince the players to defect even if the
game is played in quantum domain.
5 Conclusion
Our paper proves that repeated games can be quantized. That is, we have shown that
appropriately modified the MW scheme for 2× 2 quantum games can indeed generalize
a twice repeated game. In addition, such quantized game can be further analyzed by
strategic as well as extensive form games. Our results also indicate (with the use of
the twice repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma) that playing repeated games in the quantum
domain can give superior results in comparison with the classical ones. At the same
time we have answered why the previous approach [2] cannot be treated as a correct
protocol for quantum repeated games. The main objection is that the protocol [2] is
unable to consider a full set of strategies available to players. In contrary to the Iqbal
and Toor’s scheme, the protocol defined in this paper is free from the mentioned fault.
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